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D. Brad Wright, MS
From 1978 to 1983, researchers at the University of North Carolina conducted a
National Evaluation of Rural Primary Care Programs. Thirty years later, many of
the programs they studied have closed, but the challenges of providing rural
health care have persisted. I explored the histories of 4 surviving rural primary
care programs and identified factors that contributed to their sustainability.
These included physician advocates, innovative practices, organizational flexi-
bility, and community integration. As rural health programs look ahead, iden-
tifying future generations of physician advocates is a crucial next step in
developing the rural primary care workforce. It is also important for these
programs to find ways to cope with high rates of staff turnover. (Am J Public
Health. 2009;99:1612–1618. doi:10.2105/AJPH.2008.146050)
The health care system in the rural United
States faces many challenges. Compared with
urban populations, rural residents are more
likely to be low income, uninsured, and in poor
health.1 Per capita federal spending on rural
health, despite an arguably greater need for
services, is not quite half that for health care
nationally.2 Limited resources impose financial
constraints on rural primary care programs that
provide a large amount of uncompensated care,
which in turn threatens organizational sustain-
ability. Rural primary care programs are the sole
source of health care in many communities; thus
their survival is vitally important.
From 1978 to 1983, researchers at the
Health Services Research Center (now the Cecil
G. Sheps Center for Health Services Research)
at the University of North Carolina at Chapel
Hill undertook a comprehensive study of rural
primary care programs. At the time, there was a
major push by government, advocates, and
health services researchers to expand primary
care programs in rural areas but uncertainty
about the best way to do so. The National
Evaluation of Rural Primary Care Programs
(hereafter, National Evaluation) sought to cat-
egorize rural primary care programs and assess
their relative effectiveness.
The National Evaluation identified and
contacted 998 organizations—all externally
supported rural primary care programs existing
in the United States as of 1979. Of those, 640
responded and met inclusion criteria, and 467
programs in operation for more than a year
were selected for further study. Five types of
organization were identified: comprehensive
health centers, group practices, institutional
extension practices, free-standing primary care
centers, and solo physician practices. Stratified
random samples were drawn to ensure repre-
sentation of each program type in subsequent
parts of the National Evaluation. The re-
searchers conducted site visits for 40 programs.
Their methods are discussed more fully else-
where.3–6
The National Evaluation found that the
majority of programs had difficulty covering
their expenses. Financial instability threatened
the long-term sustainability of many programs,
and roughly 1 in 4 programs reported difficulty
recruiting and retaining clinical staff.3 In the 25
years since the original evaluation, 10 of the 40
programs have ceased to operate. A sizable
literature, including an entire issue of Health
Services Research, has reported on factors leading
to such facility and program closures.7–11 Shi
et al. followed up the original study with a
quantitative examination of rural primary care
program survival in 1978 to 1987.12
I documented the history of 4 of the 30
programs that participated in the original
evaluation and are still in operation and ex-
plored the factors that allowed these programs
to continue operating in the face of financial
and other barriers that threatened their long-
term sustainability. I employed qualitative
methods and recent data to better understand
the phenomenon of sustainability.
METHODS
I used a multicase design to identify factors
associated with long-term sustainability in rural
primary care programs. First, I reviewed all of
the National Evaluation files, which included
information on the 40 programs selected for
site visits. I identified the 30 programs still in
operation, by an Internet search and review of
Health Resources and Services Administration
records. From these 30, I used information-
oriented sampling to identify the 4 programs
that had the largest and most comprehensive
files from the National Evaluation and the most
detail in their site visit reports. This purposive
sampling ensured that enough material was
available to construct a thorough organiza-
tional history. Geographic representation was a
secondary consideration in the selection of
cases.
I reviewed the files for each program in
depth to construct its full history. I selected
keywords from the National Evaluation files to
facilitate an Internet search for current pro-
gram information. I combined all the informa-
tion to develop chronologically ordered pro-
gram narratives. I reviewed and coded primary
and secondary resources, which comprised
historical records, newspaper articles, inter-
viewer notes, clinician surveys, and other
documents belonging to the original National
Evaluation files. Quotations given without ci-
tation in this report were taken from unidenti-
fied interviewers’ field notes from these files.
A literature review on health care organiza-
tion survival and sustainability suggested 8
broad coding themes: program origins, com-
munity demographics, community perceptions
of and attitudes toward the program, program
interaction within the community environ-
ment (e.g., collaboration with a hospital),
clinician recruitment and retention, clinicians’
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perceptions of and attitudes toward the com-
munity, revenues and funding, and actions
taken to sustain the program when faced with
the possibility of closure. I derived the language
of the themes from a synthesis of various
recurrent themes found throughout the litera-
ture. Many of the themes are described by the
6 domains of sustainability (political, institu-
tional, financial, economic, client, and work-
force) in primary care as delineated by
Sibthorpe et al.13 I used these themes as a
framework for open coding (a method that
allows the addition of new codes suggested by
the material) the documents in each file to
identify emergent themes within the broader
concepts. I then analyzed the coded historical
narratives to identify common themes related to
long-term sustainability occurring across pro-
grams.
RESULTS
The Laurel Fork and Clear Fork Health
Centers
The Clear Fork Health Center, located in
Clairfield, Tennessee (population 1108), was, at
its founding in 1969, the first community
health center in Tennessee. Soon thereafter,
the Laurel Fork Clinic opened in nearby
Frakes, Kentucky. These clinics served the
mostly White residents of a geographically
isolated, low-income Appalachian coal-mining
community along the Tennessee–Kentucky
border. Travel through the mountains was slow
and frequently dangerous, especially in the
winter, and there was (and is) no public trans-
portation.
Jesse Walker, MD, who had moved to
Clairfield in the 1950s to work for the United
Mine Workers, joined the Clear Fork staff in
1972. Walker, who had a rural upbringing and
was highly involved in the community, began
to oversee activity at both the Clear Fork and
Laurel Fork clinics. Walker spent 1 day a week
at each site; most cases were handled by nurse
practitioners and physician assistants, allowing
the clinics to treat many more patients than
they otherwise could have.
Nationally, the use of such new health pro-
fessionals was strongly opposed by the medical
establishment, which perceived them as a
threat to physicians’ scope of practice.14 At the
time, Medicare and Medicaid did not reimburse
nonphysician providers unless a doctor was also
present in the exam room. Walker worked with
Representative John Duncan and the Appala-
chian Regional Commission to testify before
Congress in support of ‘‘physician extenders’’ and
the Rural Health Clinic Services Act.15,16
In 1976, an umbrella organization, Laurel
Fork–Clear Fork Health Centers, Inc, was
formed, with Walker as its medical director.17
By 1980, the program was sufficiently estab-
lished to pursue expansion. The clinics hoped to
expand from 1 physician on staff to 5, and the
Clear Fork clinic was expanded by 200 square
feet to handle a larger patient load. Kentucky and
Tennessee now had 2 clinics each. However,
during the 1980s the Reagan administration
drastically reduced funding for many domestic
federal programs, including health centers, and
the Laurel Fork Clinic was closed.18
According to the study files, this sacrifice
enabled the remaining clinics to weather the
storm of recession and cutbacks while the
number of patients treated climbed—from
6487 patients in 1981 to more than 11000
patients in 1987—as the national uninsured
rate grew. For his efforts, Walker was named
Rural Health Practitioner of the Year in 1985
by the National Rural Health Care Association.
In February 1998, the program was reorgan-
ized into the Dayspring Family Health Center,
Inc. The Clear Fork Clinic remains operational as
a satellite site, along with the Cumberland River
Clinic (Williamsburg, KY) and the Indian
Mountain Clinic (Jellico, TN). Today, 6 physi-
cians, 2 nurse practitioners, and 3 physician
assistants serve the 3 sites. These clinics handle
44000 patient encounters per year, generating
$3.5 million in annual patient revenue.
The Dayspring center is affiliated with Jellico
Community Hospital and received a $1.7 mil-
lion federal grant in fiscal year 2002. It plans to
implement a progressive health information
technology program, to be completed between
2008 and 2010, that will equip each exami-
nation room with wireless access to electronic
medical records to facilitate both electronic
prescription and access to immunization and
medication histories.19
The Teche Action Clinic
When the Teche Action Clinic opened its
doors in 1974 in the bayou town of Franklin,
Louisiana (population 7822), it was the first
community health center in the state and had
already faced down strong racially motivated
opposition from the medical establishment
and the local power structure. Nationally, the
health center movement sought to empower
vulnerable populations and had direct links to
the civil rights movement; locally, it drew
substantial White opposition, particularly from
the Franklin Foundation Hospital and the
owners of large sugar plantations, many of
whom sat on the hospital board. The majority
of the area’s residents were low-income Blacks
whose sole source of income was the sugar
plantations: they were paid annually and
threatened with loss of their jobs if they sought
additional employment during the off-season.
The clinic was created by a human relations
council led by local residents Rose and Bernard
Broussard that had been formed to address
the racial tension. Teche’s mandate was to
provide primary care to the predominantly
Black farmworkers who did not qualify for
Medicaid. The program was initially funded by
a federal migrant health grant, because the
target population was seasonally employed. By
1978, the clinic was receiving community
health center funding.
The clinic overcame community opposition
when a local physician got involved in the
program, bridging the gap between the fledg-
ling clinic and the medical establishment.
According to an interviewer’s field notes, this
‘‘cooled much of the opposition’’ and allowed
the clinic to gain a foothold in the community.
Still, some physicians opposed to the clinic
encouraged the hospital to submit a competi-
tive grant application claiming that the hospital
and private physicians could provide the same
services less expensively. Clinic supporters
worried that this competition would force the
clinic to close, because providers at the clinic
were already feeling financial pressures (e.g.,
the head physician made <$40000 a year in
1981). Ultimately, however, the hospital never
applied for the grant.
Grudging acceptance of the clinic by the
local medical community enabled Teche to
survive in the early years. By the time of a1981
site visit, investigators reported that
this clinic is now mature and has conquered its
organizational problems of a clinical program
under client sponsorship and control. Stability of
personnel and funding are crucial to its future.
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The black farmer now, for the first time, has a
health program with which he or she can identify
and one which they help to develop.
Like the Clear Fork Clinic, Teche led the way
with midlevel providers, becoming the first
program in Louisiana to employ a nurse prac-
titioner and a diabetes educator. The program
continues to employ such professionals. Today,
the clinic is the health care home for more than
8000 patients. The Franklin clinic has satellites
in Edgard, Dulac, and Houma, Louisiana. To-
gether, the 4 sites employ 5 physicians, 3
dentists, 1 physician assistant, 6 nurse practi-
tioners, 1 pharmacist, and 2 social workers.
Some 40% of the budget comes from federal
grants and 60% from generated income.
Members of the community attribute the
continued growth and success of Teche to Gary
Wiltz, MD. Wiltz, became the clinic’s medical
director in1982 while a member of the National
Health Service Corps (NHSC), a federal program
that trains clinicians and offers them financial
incentives to work in underserved areas. Wiltz
was named chief executive officer of the clinic in
2003. His commitment to the community was
invaluable in the late summer of 2005, when
Hurricane Katrina hit New Orleans and the
surrounding community was called upon to help
handle the influx of evacuees. Two of Teche’s
sites closed temporarily after Katrina because of
power outages, but Teche managed to respond
to many evacuees’ health care needs. In March
2007, Wiltz testified before Congress:
My family personally housed19 family members
for many months after the disaster hit. . . . As of
May [2006], Teche Action Clinic has cared for
hundreds of Katrina evacuees, added two dis-
placed providers, and by the end of August will
be employing five evacuees on its staff.20
Wiltz also told the representatives about his
background:
My roots run deep in New Orleans. I can trace
my ancestry back for over 4 generations. I was
born at Charity Hospital in 1953 on the ‘‘col-
ored’’ ward section of the then-segregated hos-
pital. I grew up and attended the public school
system in New Orleans, earned a scholarship to
Tulane University, and later attended Tulane
Medical School where I was fortunate enough to
earn a National Health Service Corps scholarship
while in medical school. . . . Upon completion of
my residency, I was assigned to Teche Action
Clinic in Franklin, to serve my 3 year service pay-
back obligation; 25 years later, I am still prac-
ticing medicine at that same site.20
Franklin’s population had declined in recent
years, and even more residents fled the area
after Hurricane Katrina. The town’s population
dropped from 9004 in 2000 to 7879 in 2006.
Teche is a well-established operation, but at
some point a shrinking population base may no
longer sustain the clinic, necessitating re-
trenchment, which could take a variety of
forms: reducing services offered, reducing staff,
or closing a satellite clinic.
Members of the board break ground for Teche Action Clinic’s new facility, 1989. Image
courtesy of Alfreida Edwards of the Teche Action Clinic. Used with permission.
Patients wait to be seen at the Teche Action Clinic, 1980. Image courtesy of Alfreida Edwards
of the Teche Action Clinic. Used with permission.
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La Clinica del Pueblo de Rio Arriba
The early history of Rio Arriba County, New
Mexico, is one of ethnic conflict between
indigenous occupants and US settlers. In 1848,
the US government gave a land grant (the
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo) to the indige-
nous community of Tierra Amarilla (popula-
tion 750), but there was some ambiguity over
whether this grant was to the community or to
one Manuel Martinez, as later claimed by his
descendant Francisco Martinez and confirmed
by Congress in 1860.21 After the congressional
decision, Martinez sold the land to Thomas B.
Catron. This denial of ownership to the original
grantees of the lands of Tierra Amarilla was
typical of tactics used by English settlers to move
American Indians off their land.
It was from this history of conflict that the
clinic at Tierra Amarilla arose. Indigenous
people founded La Clinica del Pueblo de Rio
Arriba in 1969 as an outgrowth of a major
confrontation in the community that took place
in 1967, when a group of land grant activists
known as Alianza (Alliance) conducted an
armed raid of the local courthouse in an
attempt to make a citizens’ arrest of the district
attorney. Elected officials, bankers, and land-
owners all opposed the clinic, which they
viewed as an extension of the long-standing
land grant dispute. Notes by a National Evalu-
ation investigator who conducted a site visit
described the community conflicts:
The ‘‘haves’’ (bankers, landowners, and elected
politicians) have been virtually at war with the
‘‘have nots’’ who run the clinic. The latter
stormed the courthouse in 1967. The former
developed a competing clinic in Chama, 12 miles
north. When the Chama clinic opened, the Tierra
Amarilla clinic mysteriously burned to the
ground. Antonio Devargas, Administrator at
Tierra Amarilla, blames the Chama supporters.
For the next 20 years, hampered by geo-
graphic and cultural isolation, La Clinica barely
survived and never developed into a self-
sufficient—or even expanding—rural health
clinic. The nearest hospital was 68 miles away,
geographic factors posed transportation bar-
riers, and community attitudes toward the
program were strongly divided. Although the
clinic enjoyed the loyalty of the local indige-
nous population, 75% of whom lived below the
federal poverty line, the only organized support
for the clinic came from the Chicano political
organization La Raza Unida [The United Race].
In discussing when this program ‘‘took off,’’ the
interviewers wrote, ‘‘It hasn’t and it won’t. It has
probably gone as far as it will go. It’s inevitably
limited by its philosophy which results in re-
fusing to solicit any government funds other
than NHSC.’’
The indigenous residents of Tierra Amarilla established a farm co-op through La Clinica.
Image courtesy of La Clinica del Pueblo de Rio Arriba (available at: http://
www.laclinicadelpuebloderioarriba.com/history.htm). Used with permission.
A look at the La Clinica examination facilities, circa 1980. Image courtesy of La Clinica del
Pueblo de Rio Arriba (available at: http://www.laclinicadelpuebloderioarriba.com/
history.htm). Used with permission.
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For more than 2 decades, La Clinica con-
tinued to operate with 1 physician, 2 nurses,
and 2 promotoras [promoters], but, as the
investigators predicted, with little growth. The
turning point came in 1992 when the clinic’s
board of directors successfully applied for fed-
eral funding and community health center
status.22 La Clinica now participates in the
Health Resources and Services Administration’s
Diabetes Health Disparities Collaborative, an
effort to integrate the work of health centers with
the resources of national, state, and local health
care organizations to implement evidence-based
best practices and reduce health disparities.
La Clinica has partnerships with the New
Mexico Department of Health Diabetes Preven-
tion and Control Program, various pharmaceu-
tical companies, the New Mexico State Univer-
sity Cooperative Extension Office, Rio West
Medical Roadrunner Footwear for Foot Care,
and the Con Alma Foundation. La Clinica also
serves as a rotation site for psychiatry and
behavioral health students from the University
of New Mexico Health Sciences Center.23
The infusion of federal funds has bolstered La
Clinica, but it remains to be seen whether
these affiliations will open the organization up to
more resources, added stability, and future
growth.
The Yuba Feather Communities Health
Program
The Yuba Feather Communities Health
Program was started in Brownsville, California
(population 1069), in 1974 by local resident
Robert Kearney, a retiree who took it upon
himself to submit the first NHSC funding grant
for Intermountain Communities Services, Inc,
and continued to serve as the project director
until at least 1989.
Brownsville is located in northern California
in the foothills of the Sierras, where forestry is
the dominant industry. During the late 1970s
and early 1980s there was an in-migration of
predominantly White, young, urban exiles,
many of whom lived in trailer parks and mobile
homes and were described in an investigator’s
notes as ‘‘very free-spirited activist-types who
shun[ned] government intervention in daily
life.’’ Traversing the mountains was dangerous,
especially in winter. Many people therefore
went without preventive care, and when the
Yuba Feather clinic first opened, late-stage
cancer, uncontrolled diabetes, and hyperten-
sion were prevalent.
From the clinic’s inception, medical director
William Hoffman, MD, has been instrumental
in the program’s success. One investigator de-
scribed Hoffman as a workaholic who focused
solely on medical issues. He sought to treat one
patient at a time rather than try to change the
community or solve its problems. The investi-
gator described Hoffman’s goals:
to provide 24-hour, comprehensive family prac-
tice that includes hospital care, out calls, and
emergency care. That philosophy has been as-
sumed by the organization and for anyone to
function within it they must accept that.
In 1976, John Rose, MD, joined the clinic
staff and fit in well with Hoffman’s model.
Although he came to Yuba Feather to fulfill his
NHSC obligation, he planned to stay indefi-
nitely, as both he and Hoffman have done.
Both doctors describe themselves as being
highly involved in community activities, highly
committed to remaining in the community, and
highly satisfied with their practice.
A satellite site was opened in the late 1970s
in Feather Falls, but as early as 1981, investi-
gators noted that it was in danger of closing
because it was only 30% self-sufficient (i.e.,
revenues equaled only 30% of the clinic’s total
budget). At the same time, the Brownsville site
was fully self-sufficient. Indeed, the Feather
Falls site closed the same year.
By the end of the decade and into the early
1990s, the Brownsville site also experienced
financial difficulties, precipitated by a changing
patient mix with a greater proportion of low-
income individuals, both publicly insured and
uninsured (70% of patients had Medi-Cal or
Medicare). The clinic affiliated with Sutter
North Medical Foundation in 1993 and se-
cured federal funding in 2002 from the Rural
Health Initiative (RHI), which brought higher
reimbursement from Medi-Cal and Medicare.
Hoffman described the benefits of the new
arrangements:
Given our high percentage of low income and
uninsured patients, we wouldn’t be able to con-
tinue without the RHI funding and support from
Sutter North. Being part of a larger medical
group has made it easier for us to meet the
administrative demands necessary to run a small
practice and given us access to technologies we
couldn’t afford on our own. Our patients also get
access to specialists, hospital care, home health
and other services available through Sutter
North and Sutter Health. Just because you live in
the country, doesn’t mean you shouldn’t have
access to the same services as people in a big
city.24
Yuba Feather celebrated its 30th anniver-
sary in 2004 with the same 2 doctors at the
helm. The clinic, which started in 2 log cabins
belonging to the forestry service in 1974 and
served just 2000 people annually by1986, has
grown into a 7000-square-foot medical facility
serving some 10000 people.24 Hoffman, who
remains the chief medical officer, noted,
I’ve known many of my patients for 20 or 30
years and treated their children and grandchil-
dren. I love the people and challenges of prac-
ticing in a small rural area where I can take care
of patients of all ages, no matter their ability to
pay. I may earn less than I would in a big city, but
the satisfaction I get from my job is priceless.24
In a 1980 interview with Time Magazine,
Rose, the board’s vice president, said, ‘‘I could
be making more money in the valley, but what
else could I want? I think I’m just a hick at
heart.’’25
DISCUSSION
Together, these cases suggest that long-term
organizational sustainability is the result of a
complex combination of structures and pro-
cesses present both inside and outside the
organization. Foremost among these is the
presence of dedicated, tireless physician advo-
cates. With the exception of La Clinica, each of
the programs had at least 1 prominent physi-
cian who was highly committed to and in-
volved with the community and who provided
leadership, continuity, and stability to the pro-
gram in addition to his clinical role.
With the exception of Yuba Feather, each of
the programs encountered strong opposition
during its inception. In some cases the medical
establishment opposed the programs, viewing
both the clinics and their use of so-called
physician extenders (nonphysician providers)
as threats to physicians’ scope of practice. In
other cases, the clinics were the target of racist
opposition. In the face of both types of chal-
lenge, a physician acting simultaneously as
advocate and member of the entrenched power
structure was able to bridge the gap between
the program and the opponents in the com-
munity by mollifying influential stakeholders.
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Physician advocates represent a critical ele-
ment of political sustainability by not only
championing their programs but also neutral-
izing threats to sustainability that arise when
the status quo is challenged.13
Another major success factor I observed was
the willingness of programs to employ innova-
tive solutions to problems. For example, the use
of alternative kinds of providers (e.g., nurse
practitioners and physician assistants) by all of
the clinics was revolutionary at the beginning
and met with opposition from the medical
community. But it allowed more patients to be
treated efficiently, a crucial consideration in
understaffed rural areas. Today, analogous ef-
forts exist in the form of care management
programs (e.g., Kentucky’s Skycap Program),
culturally sensitive outreach efforts (e.g., the
promotoras [promoters] model), and transdis-
ciplinary health care teams (e.g., dentists cross-
training pediatricians to apply dental seal-
ants).26 Programs with limited resources are
often forced to think creatively and find new and
better ways to accomplish their mission.
Organizational flexibility was another char-
acteristic of successful programs. If clinic leaders
remained more committed to the mission of
caring for the underserved than to the clinic
building, specific geographic location, founda-
tion name, or other concerns, then the program—
although it might be modified—persisted.
The Yuba Feather and Clear Fork clinics were
excellent examples of this quality, and the
experience of the Tierra Amarilla Clinic illus-
trated how rigidity can retard the growth of a
program.
For Yuba Feather, organizational flexibility
appeared to be crucial to survival. Had the
program tried to hang on to the Feather Falls
site despite all indications of its failure to thrive,
it was entirely possible for the Brownsville
location to be taken down with it. By recog-
nizing that it was a financial liability and closing
the Feather Falls site, organization leaders were
able to preserve the Brownsville location and
allow it to flourish. Similarly, closure of the
Laurel Fork clinic enabled the Clear Fork clinic
to survive funding cuts.
Conversely, the strong commitment of
Tierra Amarilla’s indigenous people to each
other and the land, although noble, also made
them rigid. This rigidity prevented the clinic
from enjoying many of the opportunities open
to similar providers—including financial sup-
port—for more than 2 decades. Tierra Amar-
illa’s supporters and patients were unwilling to
compromise their values regarding certain
deep-seated conflicts with their White neigh-
bors over land, even if it meant improving their
health services. Now that the organization has
decided to accept federal funding, it may ex-
perience more growth.
A final major success factor was how well a
clinic integrated with the local community.
Sibthorpe et al. cite such interorganizational
networks as facilitators of institutional sustain-
ability.13 Ultimately, long-term sustainability
depends on clinics becoming financially self-
sufficient, but this will be difficult for all of the
programs I studied, because they serve popula-
tions with large proportions of persons who are
uninsured, of low income, and in poor health.1
This problem has worsened over time as the
number of uninsured has risen, reducing reve-
nues. These case studies show, however, that
affiliating with other organizations, such as a
nearby hospital, can help to strengthen a clinic’s
financial position.
As noted by the National Evaluation,
A close relationship between rural primary care
clinics and hospitals clearly favors the self-suffi-
ciency of the clinic, mostly through the overall
reduction of costs, especially laboratory, com-
munity service, and administrative service costs.6
The Laurel Fork Clinic’s affiliation with the
hospital in Jellico and Yuba Feather’s affiliation
with Sutter North are evidence of this. Con-
versely, the early tension between the Teche
Action Clinic and Franklin Hospital demon-
strates the competitive threat a hospital can
pose to a clinic when no mutually beneficial
arrangement exists.
It is also important to note the role that
federal funding plays in the sustainability of
rural primary care programs. Given that these
organizations serve a patient mix that is dis-
proportionately of low income and uninsured,
financial self-sufficiency may simply be an un-
attainable goal. Ongoing support of these pro-
grams through federal grants is essential to
their continued viability. However, federal
funding for these programs varies from year to
year, often for political reasons. Thus, rural
primary care programs must develop the ca-
pacity to adapt during downturns. Strong ad-
vocates, a willingness to innovate,
organizational flexibility, and community inte-
gration are all vital to developing this capacity.
Limitations
This study had several limitations. Purposive
sampling of centers on the basis of the avail-
ability of secondary data may have biased the
results, because it is likely that centers yielding
more information during the previous study
were systematically different from centers from
which less information was obtained. The di-
rection of this bias is unclear, although I suspect
that centers with a greater volume of available
data were strongly established centers, making
it possible that I interpreted the association
between the observed themes and organiza-
tional survival as being stronger than it really
was.
I did not present any comparison cases of
failed organizations from the National Evalua-
tion. It is possible, even likely, that clinics that
survived differed from clinics that failed in
important ways. Thus, a comparative approach
could identify factors associated with long-term
organizational sustainability. Recent informa-
tion on failed organizations, however, is rarely
available, making such a comparative study
unfeasible. By considering only surviving or-
ganizations, I identified similarities and differ-
ences among programs that may have been
associated with their long-term sustainability.
My analysis relied solely on secondary
sources. Consequently, some relevant infor-
mation may have been excluded here because
long-term organizational sustainability was not
the focus of the National Evaluation for which
the data were collected. For instance, it would
be useful to know more about the dynamics of
decision-making to better understand the de-
liberative process and other contextual factors
that shaped organizational responses. Future
studies might consider interviewing key clinical
and administrative staff to gather this data;
limited resources precluded my taking this
approach.
My findings are likely to have only theoret-
ical generality. Thus, similarly situated rural
primary care programs that started out very
small and in very low-income, sparsely popu-
lated areas could reasonably be expected to
share similar experiences. Generalizing to other
settings should be undertaken with caution.
However, the programs presented here were
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worth studying precisely because they man-
aged to persist despite unfavorable odds.
Finally, the themes I identified may or may
not be causally related to the outcome of orga-
nizational sustainability. Some of the experi-
ences of the programs described here may be
instructive; others maybe less relevant. Theonly
certainty is that the future brings change, and
how rural primary care programs respond to
that change is vital to their continued existence.
Conclusions
The most pressing questions to emerge from
this study are, What happens to these programs
after those who championed them are gone?
Are the clinics well enough established to sur-
vive under new leadership? Can comparable
replacements be found to fill the role of physi-
cian advocate? Can clinics find a way to become
less dependent on particular individuals for their
success? How can clinics plan for a smooth
leadership transition and organizational growth?
Future studies should investigate the personal
motivations clinicians have for both choosing to
practice in rural settings initially and deciding to
remain there and become invested in the com-
munities they serve. Identifying and training
health care administrators to operate these
clinics is also important.
As the government seeks ways to recruit
health care providers to underserved areas, it
must move beyond financial incentives, whose
effects are limited. Some NHSC scholars stay on
after fulfilling their service obligations, but
most report not feeling committed to or in-
volved in the communities they serve, and they
leave when their 2, 3, or 4 years are up.27
Efforts should be made to identify and foster
the motivations that drive physicians— such as
the dedicated leaders of the clinics profiled
here—who forge careers in rural medicine. If
young doctors can be enticed into such pro-
grams and nurtured so that they remain, they
might help to alleviate America’s serious health
workforce shortages in rural areas. The rural
population of this country, roughly 60 million
persons, sorely needs more clinics—and their
clinician trailblazers—like those I studied. j
About the Author
D. Brad Wright is a doctoral student in the Department of
Health Policy and Management, Gillings School of Global
Public Health, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill,
and a research assistant at the Cecil G. Sheps Center for
Health Services Research.
Correspondence can be sent to D. Brad Wright, 1300
Laurel Springs Dr, #1301, Durham, NC 27713 (e-mail:
bradwright@unc.edu). Reprints can be ordered at http://
www.ajph.org by clicking the ‘‘Reprints/Eprint’’ link.
This article was accepted December 14, 2008.
Acknowledgments
The author thanks Thomas C. Ricketts III for sharing
his insights and providing feedback during the prepara-
tion of this article.
Human Participant Protection
No protocol approval was needed for this study because
data were obtained from secondary sources.
References
1. Ricketts TC. The changing nature of rural health
care. Annu Rev Public Health. 2000;21:639–657.
2. Health care in rural America: the crisis unfolds. Joint
Task Force of the National Association of Community
Health Centers and the National Rural Health Associa-
tion. J Public Health Policy. 1989;10(1):99–111.
3. Sheps CG, Wagner EH, Schonfeld WH, et al. An
evaluation of subsidized rural primary care programs: I.
A typology of practice organizations. Am J Public Health.
1983;73:38–49.
4. Ricketts TC, Konrad TR, Wagner EH. An evaluation
of subsidized rural primary care programs: II. The en-
vironmental contexts. Am J Public Health. 1983;73:
406–413.
5. Ricketts TC, Guild PA, Sheps CG, Wagner EH. An
evaluation of subsidized rural primary care programs: III.
Stress and survival, 1981–82. Am J Public Health.
1984;74:816–819.
6. McLaughlin CP, Ricketts TC, Freund DA, Sheps CG.
An evaluation of subsidized rural primary care programs:
IV. Impact of the rural hospital on clinic self-sufficiency.
Am J Public Health. 1985;75:749–753.
7. Cowen DL, Hochstrasser DL, Friedericks C, Payne J.
Problems in the development of a rural primary care
center. J Community Health. 1976;2:52–59.
8. Gonzalez EH, Phillips RL Jr, Pugno PA. A study of
closure of family practice residency programs. Fam Med.
2003;35:706–710.
9. Longo DR, Chase GA. Structural determinants of
hospital closure. Med Care. 1984;22:388–402.
10. Mayer JD, Kohlenberg ER, Sieferman GE, Rosenblatt
RA. Patterns of rural hospital closure in the United
States. Soc Sci Med. 1987;24:327–334.
11. Alan Sager, ed. Hospital closures. Part I. Health Serv
Res. 1983;18(3, theme issue):359–475.
12. Shi L, Samuels ME, Konrad TR, Porter CQ, Stoskopf
CH, Richter DL. Rural primary care program survival: an
analysis of financial variables. J Rural Health. 1994;
10:173–182.
13. Sibthorpe BM, Glasgow NJ, Wells RW. Emergent
themes in the sustainability of primary health care inno-
vation. Med J Aust. 2005;183(suppl 10):S77–S80.
14. Yankauer A. The new health professionals: three
examples. Ann Rev Public Health. 1982;3:249–276.
15. Jellico doctor honored. Campbell County Times. April
7, 1977.
16. Rural Health Clinic Services Act. 42 USC x1396A
(2006).
17. Wiebe C. Five physician innovators: Dr Jesse
Walker, Dr Sid Wolfe, Dr Ruth Stein, Dr Harold
Freeman, Dr Gordon Perkin. New Physician. 1986;35(4):
35–50.
18. Sardell A. The US Experiment in Social Medicine: The
Community Health Center Program, 1965–1986. Pitts-
burgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press; 1988.
19. FedSpending.org. Assistance to recipients in Ten-





20. Hearings Before the House Energy and Commerce
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, 110th
Cong, 1st Sess(2007) (testimony of Gary Wiltz, MD,
executive director, Teche Action Clinic). Available at:
http://energycommerce.house.gov/cmte_mtgs/110-oi-
hrg.031307.Wiltz-Testimony.pdf. Accessed October 13,
2008.
21. The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. Library of
Congress Hispanic Reading Room Web site. Available at:
http://www.loc.gov/rr/hispanic/ghtreaty/ghtreaty.html.
Accessed September 21, 2007.
22. History. La Clinica del Pueblo de Rio Arriba Web site.
Available at: http://www.laclinicadelpuebloderioarriba.
com/history.htm. Accessed September 21, 2007.
23. Rural Psychiatry & Behavioral Health Training
Program. University of New Mexico Health Sciences
Center. Available at: http://hsc.unm.edu/som/
psychiatry/RuralPsych. Accessed August 22, 2007.
24. Sutter North Medical Foundation. Brownsville cele-
brates 30th anniversary. Available at: http://snmf.org/
news/articles/brownsville_celebrates_30.html. Accessed
June 30, 2008.
25. Thompson D. In California: new doc on the hill.
Time Magazine. January 21, 1980.
26. Costich JF. A CAP that works: the Southeastern
Kentucky Community Access Program. Presented at:
132nd Annual Meeting of the American Public Health
Association; November 6–10, 2004; Washington, DC.
27. Cullen TJ, Hart LG, Whitcomb ME, Rosenblatt RA.
The National Health Service Corps: rural physician ser-
vice and retention. J Am Board Fam Pract. 1997;10:
272–279.
FRAMING HEALTH MATTERS
1618 | Framing Health Matters | Peer Reviewed | Wright American Journal of Public Health | September 2009, Vol 99, No. 9
